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I. INTRODUCTION
Americans love sports. They are avid sports spectators and partici--
pants. For example, annual Super Bowl football games account for
nine of the ten most watched television programs of all time.' Ac-
cording to the Census Bureau, "the number of people taking part in
recreation is greater now than in 1965, and it will continue to rise"
as the population grows.' The trend is toward "more active par-
ticipatory forms of recreation." But who is responsible when a par-
ticipant is injured during play? Is it the sponsor of the game? The
teammate or opponent who accidentally injured the player? Or is it
the individual player, who assumed the risk of injury when choosing
to play?
The legal answer to this question is uncertain in California. The
California Supreme Court has not clearly ruled whether reasonable
implied assumption of risk4 (hereinafter RIAR) remains a complete
defense to an action for negligence under California's system of com-
parative fault. The California Supreme Court may resolve this issue
soon, because it has granted review in numerous assumption of risk
1. NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE, OFFICIAL 1990 NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE
RECORD AND FACT BOOK 302 (1990). Over one million fans watched some portion of the
game according to A.C. Nielsen figures. The only non-Super Bowl show in the top ten
was the 1983 M*A*S*H* special.
2. Robinson, Where's the Boom?, AMERICAN DEMOGRAPHICS, March 1987, at 34,
56. Information from the National Recreation Surveys conducted by the Census Bureau
in 1965 and 1982.
3. Id. at 36.
4. RIAR occurs when a plaintiff acts reasonably in encountering a known risk of
injury. It differs from express assumption of risk, because the agreement is implied. It
differs from unreasonable assumption of risk where a plaintiff acts negligently toward
herself in confronting the risk of injury. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496A, at
561-62 (2d ed. 1965) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (SECOND)].
5. Comparative fault is a system whereby damages are apportioned according to
each party's negligence. Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 829, 532 P.2d 1226,
1243, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858, 875 (1975). Li left open the question whether RIAR remains a
complete defense. See infra note 15 and accompanying text.
cases. 6
In the meantime, California's intermediate appellate courts grap-
ple with the viability and application of the RIAR doctrine.7 In a
recent Fourth District decision, the Court of Appeal in Knight v.
Jewett8 "join[ed] the clear California trend ...that - notwith-
standing the adoption of comparative negligence - reasonable im-
plied assumption of risk remains a viable defense."9 In Knight, the
plaintiff was injured in an impromptu game of touch football, during
a Super Bowl half-time, when an opposing player accidentally
stepped on her hand. Knight was familiar with touch football and
voluntarily joined the game. The defendant prevailed on an assump-
tion of risk defense.10
This Note will examine the controversy surrounding RIAR and
discuss its likely outcome. Section II will review the divergence of
opinion among California appellate courts and commentators. Sec-
tion III will examine Knight v. Jewett which follows the majority
position. Section IV will analyze the issues and arguments regarding
the doctrine. Section V will recommend how the California Supreme
Court should resolve the issue.
6. In addition to Knight v. Jewett, 232 Cal. App. 3d 1142, 275 Cal. Rptr. 292
(1990), rev. granted, - Cal. 3d -, 804 P.2d 1300, 278 Cal. Rptr. 203 (1991), the
California Supreme Court has granted review in Hacker v. City of Glendale, 228 Cal.
App. 3d 1013, 279 Cal. Rptr. 371 (1991), rev. granted, - Cal. 3d -, 811 P.2d
1024, 282 Cal. Rptr. 840 (1991), Krol v. Sampson, 227 Cal. App. 3d 724, 278 Cal. Rptr.
164 (1991), rev. granted, - Cal. 3d _ 811 P.2d 10, 282 Cal. Rptr. 124 (1991),
Cohen v. McIntyre, 233 Cal. App. 3d 201, 277 Cal. Rptr. 91 (1991), rev. granted, -
Cal. 3d _ 806 P.2d 842, 279 Cal. Rptr. 100 (1991), Harrold v. Rolling J Ranch, 228
Cal. App. 3d 260, 266 Cal. Rptr. 734 (1990), modified, 218 Cal. App. 3d 841a, rev.
granted, - Cal. 3d _ 791 P.2d 290, 269 Cal. Rptr. 720 (1990), and Ford v.
Gouin, 227 Cal. App. 3d 1175, 266 Cal. Rptr. 870 (1990), rev. granted, -Cal. 3d
,791 P.2d 290, 269 Cal. Rptr. 720 (1990). These cases are not citeable authority
(see rules 976(d) and 977(a) Cal. Rules of Court), but are used in this Note for illustra-
tive purposes.
The supreme court has already heard oral argument in Ford. The case has caught the
interest of the popular press, which sees far-reaching effects: "The court's decision could
effect not only participants in recreational sports but those who face risks on the job. The
vigorous legal debate surrounding the [Ford] case has raised broad questions about free-
dom of choice and personal responsibility." Hager, Court to Decide Who Pays for Tak-
ing a Risk, Los Angeles Times, July 8, 1991, at Al, col. 4, A19, col. 1 (San Diego
County ed.).
7. This Note will deal only with the viability and application of the doctrine in
actions for negligence in sports injury cases like Knight v. Jewett. This Note will deal
only tangentially with the doctrine in employment and strict liability cases.
8. 232 Cal. App. 3d 1142, 275 Cal. Rptr. 292 (1990), rev. granted, - Cal. 3d
-, 804 P.2d 1300, 278 Cal. Rptr. 203 (1991).
9. Id. at 1149, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 295.
10. Id. at 1150, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 296.
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II. BACKGROUND
A. California Supreme Court
In 1975, the California Supreme Court decided Li v. Yellow Cab
Co." In Li, the court replaced the "'all-or-nothing' rule of contribu-
tory negligence"12 with a system of comparative fault, "the funda-
mental purpose of which shall be to assign responsibility and liability
for damage in direct proportion to the amount of negligence of each
of the parties. 1 3 The court explained how the acceptance of compar-
ative fault would impact other legal doctrines, such as assumption of
the risk:
As for assumption of risk, we have recognized in this state that this defense
overlaps that of contributory negligence to some extent and in fact is made
up of at least two distinct defenses. "To simplify greatly, it has been ob-
served ... that in one kind of situation, to wit, where a plaintiff unreasona-
bly undertakes to encounter a specific known risk imposed by a defendant's
negligence, plaintiff's conduct, although he may encounter that risk in a
prudent manner, is in reality a form of contributory negligence .... Other
kinds of situations within the doctrine of assumption of risk are those, for
example, where plaintiff is held to agree to relieve defendant of an obliga-
tion of reasonable conduct toward him. Such a situation would not involve
contributory negligence, but rather a reduction of defendant's duty of
care." We think it clear that the adoption of a system of comparative negli-
gence should entail the merger of the defense of assumption of risk into the
general scheme of assessment of liability in proportion to fault in those par-
ticular cases in which the form of assumption of risk involved is no more
than a variant of contributory negligence.1 '
Despite the supreme court's effort to clarify the status of assump-
tion of risk under comparative fault, California appellate courts have
debated the supreme court's meaning and intent in the sixteen years
since Li was decided. 5 All appellate courts generally agree that un-
reasonable implied assumption of risk was subsumed under the com-
parative negligence system as a form of contributory negligence. 6
11. 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975).
12. Id. at 828, 532 P.2d at 1243, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 875. Contributory negligence
bars all recovery if the plaintiff in any way contributes to his own injury. Id. at 808, 532
P.2d at 1230, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 861.
13. Id. at 829, 532 P.2d at 1243, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 875.
14. Id. at 824-25, 532 P.2d at 1240-41, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 872-73. (quoting Grey v.
Fibreboard Paper Products Co., 65 Cal. 2d 240, 418 P.2d 153, 53 Cal. Rptr. 545 (1966)
(other citations omitted; emphasis in original)).
15. "Li raised considerable doubt as to the survival of assumption of the risk as a
tort defense, except for express contractual assumption." Knight, 232 Cal. App. 3d at
1148, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 294. The language, "where plaintiff is held to agree," may refer
to only express assumption of risk situations, or to RIAR situations as well. See infra
text accompanying note 100.
16. See, e.g., Knight, 232 Cal. App. 3d at 1149, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 295; Harrold v.
All courts further agree that express assumption of risk, when an
oral or written contract exists between the parties, clearly survives as
a. defense.17 The issue to be resolved is whether reasonable implied
assumption of risk (RIAR) has been abolished or retained as a sepa-
rate and complete defense to actions for negligence.
B. Fifth and Second Districts Favor Abolition
The Fifth District Court of Appeal was the first court to rule on
reasonable implied assumption of risk as a separate defense to an
action for negligence in the post-Li era.18 In its 1983 decision in
Segoviano v. Housing Authority,19 the court came out squarely
against the doctrine, holding that RIAR "plays no part in the com-
parative negligence system of California .... -o Interestingly, the
facts confronting the Segoviano court were very similar to those in
Knight. The plaintiff, Segoviano, was injured while participating in a
recreational flag football game sponsored by the defendant Housing
Authority. 21 Segoviano was pushed out-of-bounds during a play by
the defendant's recreational coordinator who was playing on the op-
posing team. Segoviano fell and severely injured his shoulder.22 Like
Knight, Segoviano had prior knowledge of, and experience with the
game.23
Unlike the Knight court, however, the Segoviano court refused to
recognize the RIAR doctrine, and found for the plaintiff. In an opin-
ion which has been repeatedly criticized by other courts,24 the
Rolling J. Ranch, 228 Cal. App. 3d 260, 269-70, 266 Cal. Rptr. 734, 740 (1990),modi-
fied, 218 Cal. App. 3d 841a, rev. granted, - Cal. 3d -, 791 P.2d 290, 269 Cal.
Rptr. 720 (1990).
17. See, e.g., Knight, 232 Cal. App. 3d at 1148, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 294; Harrold,
218 Cal. App. 3d at 269, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 740.
18. Knight, 232 Cal. App. 3d at 1148, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 294.
19. 143 Cal. App. 3d 162, 191 Cal. Rptr. 578 (1983).
20. Id. at 164, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 579. However, in a very recent case, the Fifth
District declined to follow Segoviano or the majority position of Ordway v. Superior
Court, 198 Cal. App. 3d, 243 Cal. Rptr. 536 (1988), see infra text accompanying notes
36-39. In Van Meter v. American Motor Sports Ass'n., 227 Cal. App. 3d 1198, 278 Cal.
Rptr. 288 (1991), an official, as opposed to a participant, was injured during an off-road
car race. Noting that "the status of assumption of risk has reduced itself to a battle of
'Segoviano' versus 'Ordway'. . . ," the court, nevertheless, chose a third alternative,
adopting a view espoused by Frizell and other commentators. Van Meter, 227 Cal. App.
3d at 1205, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 292. Drawing a distinction between "primary" and "sec-
ondary" assumption of risk, the court held that it was for the jury to decide whether the
hazards encountered in the activity were inherent (primary) or added (secondary), or
both, and which proximately caused the injury. Id. at 1209, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 295. Only
in the first case, primary assumption of risk, would the defense act as a complete bar. Id.
21. Segoviano, 143 Cal. App. 3d at 165, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 580.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. See, e.g., Ordway, 198 Cal. App. 3d at 104, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 539 ("In our
view, that opinion turned the law on its head."); Knight, 232 Cal. App. 3d at 1148 and
n.1, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 294 and n.1 (Segoviano "has found little support in subsequent
480
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Segoviano court interpreted Li as abolishing RIAR except in cases
of express assumption of risk.25
The Segoviano court had few allies until a Second District appel-
late court decided Harrold v. Rolling J Ranch21 in 1990. Although
recognizing the RIAR doctrine, the Harrold court contended aboli-
tion was the "[b]etter [r]easoned [v]iew."27 In Harrold, the plaintiff,
a self-proclaimed experienced horseback rider, had looped the reins
around the saddle horn and was taking off her jacket when the horse
she was riding suddenly bucked and threw her to the ground. The
stable failed to inform Harrold of a similar incident when this same
horse spooked and threw a previous rider who had waved his hat.28
The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendant stables
on a RIAR defense, but the Court of Appeal reversed .2
The Harrold court reviewed the history of assumption of risk in
California, both pre and post-Li, before concluding that "it is un-
clear" whether the doctrine of RIAR remains a complete defense to
an action for negligence.3 0 The court explained, even if the RIAR
doctrine is viable, the defense was inapplicable in this case because
Harrold did not have "actual knowledge of her horse's propensity to
spook."131 The court explained that a general knowledge that one can
fall off a horse is insufficient; Harrold would have to have been
warned of the prior incident in order for her to have assumed the
increased risk of riding the particular horse.3 2
In contrast, other Second District courts have generally upheld the
RIAR doctrine. In a case pre-dating Harrold, a Division Five court
reached the same result as the Harrold court, but recognized the
viability of RIAR.33 In Von Beltz, a stuntwoman was held not to
have assumed the increased hazards in a movie stunt when the scene
cases," and "is also contrary to ... Restatement Second of Torts, and a number of non-
California authorities" (citations omitted)).
25. Segoviano, 143 Cal. App. 3d at 169-70, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 583.
26. 228 Cal. App. 3d 260, 266 Cal. Rptr. 736 (1990), modified, 218 Cal. App. 3d
841A (1990), rev. granted, - Cal. 3d _, 791 P.2d 290, 269 Cal. Rptr. 720 (1990).
27. Id. at 269, 272, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 735, 740.
28. Id. at 263, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 736.
29. Id. at 262, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 735.
30. Id. at 269, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 740.
31. Id. at 273, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 742.
32. Id. at 275, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 743.
33. Von Beltz v. Stuntman, Inc., 207 Cal. App. 3d 1467, 1477, 255 Cal. Rptr. 755,
760 (1989). The court agreed with Ordway that RIAR is "'only another way of stating
that the defendant's duty of care has been reduced in proportion to the hazards attendant
to the event.'" Id. See also infra text accompanying notes 36-39.
was changed on the second take without her knowledge or consent.3 4
In related cases, Second District courts (including Harrold's Divi-
sion Seven) had no difficulty affirming summary judgments based on
assumption of risk.35
C. First and Fourth Districts Favor Retention
A 1988 Fourth District Court of Appeal opinion best defines the
majority position in favor of the continued viability of RIAR. In
Ordway v. Superior Court,36 Judy Casella, a professional jockey,
was thrown from her horse and injured during a horse race when
another jockey "crossed over" without sufficient clearance.37 The
court held: "Thus, our reading of Li and the authorities discussed
convinces us that the doctrine of reasonable implied assumption of
risk remains viable and, where applicable, provides a complete de-
fense to a cause of action for personal injuries."38
The Ordway court explained:
The correct analysis is this: The doctrine of reasonable implied assumption
of risk is only another way of stating that the defendant's duty of care has
been reduced in proportion to the hazards attendant to the event. Where no
duty of care is owed with respect to a particular mishap, there can be no
breach; consequently as a matter of law, a personal injury plaintiff who has
voluntarily - and reasonably - assumed the risk cannot prevail. Or stated
another way, the individual who knowingly and voluntarily assumes a risk,
whether for recreational enjoyment, economic reward, or some similar pur-
pose, is deemed to have agreed to reduce the defendant's duty of care.'
The court rejected Casella's contention that she did not consider the
sport dangerous. The court found her knowing and voluntary partici-
pation in the race constituted an implied assumption of its inherent
34. Id. at 1479, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 761. Von Beltz was severely injured when the
stunt car in which she was a passenger collided with another vehicle during the filming of
the movie "Cannonball Run." The first take of the stunt was performed without mishap;
however, unbeknownst to Von Beltz, the director told the stunt driver to double his speed
on the second take in order to heighten the effect of the scene. Id. at 1475-76, 255 Cal.
Rptr. at 759.
35. See Neinstein v. Los Angeles Dodgers, 185 Cal. App. 3d 176, 229 Cal. Rptr.
612 (1986) (spectator hit with foul ball while sitting in unscreened seat at baseball
game); King v. Magnolia Homeowners Ass'n., 205 Cal. App. 3d 1312, 253 Cal. Rptr.
140 (1988) (repairman injured climbing a ladder he knew was unsafe); Nunez v. R'Bibo,
211 Cal. App. 3d 559, 260 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1989) (experienced gardener injured in fall
while using obviously rickety ladder); Hacker v. City of Glendale, 228 Cal. App. 3d
1013, 279 Cal. Rptr. 371 (1991) (experienced tree trimmer electrocuted when high volt-
age wires touched branch of tree he was trimming), rev. granted, - Cal. 3d -, 811
P.2d 1024, 282 Cal. Rptr. 840 (1991).
36. 198 Cal. App. 3d 98, 243 Cal. Rptr. 536 (1988).
37. Id. at 109, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 542-43. The offending jockey violated a rule
which the court termed "the equine equivalent of an unsafe lane change." Id. at 109, 243
Cal. Rptr. at 543.
38. Id. at 107, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 541.
39. Id. at 104, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 539.
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risks, thus barring her suit.4 0
Although Ordway involved a professional athlete, the case embod-
ied attributes that are also present in recreational sports injury cases:
(1) the injury sustained was one that was inherent in the sport; (2)
no intent to injure was proven; (3) the plaintiff had knowledge of
and experience with the activity; and, (4) the plaintiff voluntarily
decided to participate. These factors, taken together, create the im-
plied assumption that the plaintiff reasonably confronted known
hazards, thereby relieving the defendant of the duty to take precau-
tions. Moreover, the Ordway court specifically included recreational
injury situations in its analysis when it listed "recreational enjoy-
ment" in addition to "economic reward" among the benefits of par-
ticipating in a sport.,1
The First District has followed Ordway in recreational injury
cases. 2 In Ford v. Gouin,4 a an appellate court joined "[t]he clear
California trend ... toward validating RIAR as a defense." '44 An
experienced waterskier was injured when he collided with overhang-
ing tree branches while skiing barefoot and backwards through a
narrow channel. The court cited "policy reasons" for its decision:
[T]he defense of RIAR survives in California... for the policy reason that
it is deemed fair and useful to maintain. In our contemporary and litigious
society, where fault of the parties is compared to resolve liability for injury,
one who is relieved of fault because he owes no duty should continue to
escape liability entirely .... Thus, courts in appropriate circumstances can
apply this doctrine and expeditiously resolve cases through motions for sum-
40. Id. at 111-12, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 544. The court observed that the accident in
Ordway was a
classic case of negligence, i.e., a failure to exercise due care. But by participat-
ing in the horse race, she relieved others of any duty to conform their conduct
to a standard that would exempt her from the risks inherent in a sport where
large and swift animals bearing human cargo are locked in close proximity
under great stress and excitement.
Id. at 109, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 543.
41. Id. at 104, 243 Cal. Rptr. at 539. See also infra note 96 and accompanying
text.
42. First District courts have also affirmed the doctrine in non-sports-injury cases.
See, e.g., Cohen v. McIntyre, 233 Cal. App. 3d 201, 277 Cal. Rptr. 91 (1991), (veterina-
rian voluntarily encountered the known risk of being bitten when he removed the muzzle
from a dog that had previously snapped at him) rev. granted, - Cal. 3d _ , 806
P.2d 842, 279 Cal. Rptr. 100 (1991); Donohue v. San Francisco Hous. Auth., 230 Cal.
App. 3d 635, 281 Cal. Rptr. 446 (1991), (fire fighter assumed the risk of injury when he
slipped on wet concrete stairs during a fire safety inspection), rev. granted, - Cal. 3d
-, 814 P.2d 289, 284 Cal. Rptr. 510 (1991).
43. 227 Cal. App. 3d 1175, 266 Cal. Rptr. 870 (1990), rev. granted, - Cal. 3d
791 P.2d 290, 269 Cal. Rptr. 720 (1990).
44. Id. at 1188, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 878.
mary judgment. ... 45
D. Third and Sixth Districts Signal Approval
Although the Third and Sixth Districts have not had an opportu-
nity to express .their views in a sports injury case since the adoption
of comparative negligence, both have recognized the RIAR doctrine.
In Nelson v. Hall,46 a Third District Court of Appeal held that rea-
sonable implied assumption of risk is a viable defense to strict liabil-
ity imposed by California's "Dog Bite Statute.' 47 The court ex-
plained the veterinarian assistant who was bitten by a dog under
treatment had voluntarily assumed a known risk by virtue of her
chosen profession.' 8
The Sixth District recently assumed the viability of the doctrine
for purposes of its decision in Maehl v. O'Brien,4'9 but held it inappli-
cable under the facts of the case. In this work-related injury case, an
independent coAtractor's helper was seriously hurt when the redwood
tree he was helping remove fell more quickly than he had antici-
pated, catching him before he could run to safety. Following the rea-
soning of the Second District decisions of Von Beltz and Harrold,50
the court held the injured plaintiff had not assumed the risk, as a
matter of law, because he was not specifically aware of the speed at
which a tree stripped of branches would fall.5 The court explained
that Maehl's admitted knowledge and appreciation of the general
45. Id. at 1187-88, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 877-78. A year after Ford, another First
District court upheld the RIAR defense as a complete bar to a negligence action follow-
ing a recreational softball game injury. In Krol v. Sampson, 227 Cal. App. 3d 724, 278
Cal. Rptr. 164 (1991), rev. granted, - Cal. 3d -, 811 P.2d 10, 282 Cal. Rptr. 124
(1991), the plaintiff lost an eye as the result of being hit by a thrown ball as he ran
toward second base. Rejecting the plaintiff's argument that RIAR had been eliminated
by California's adoption of comparative fault, the court adopted the Ordway analysis and
held that the doctrine "survives as a defense which can negate the duty element of a
negligence cause of action." Krol, 227 Cal. App. 3d at 727, 730, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 166,
169.
46. 165 Cal. App. 3d 709, 211 Cal. Rptr. 668 (1985).
47. Id. at 710-11, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 670 (referring to CAL. CIv. CODE § 3342
(West 1989) which specifies that a dog owner is liable for any injury even in the absence
of evidence or knowledge of vicious propensity).
48. Nelson v. Hall, 165 Cal. App. 3d at 714, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 672. "This is a case
of 'true' or 'primary' assumption of the risk whereby the defendant is impliedly relieved
of any duty of care by the plaintiff's acceptance of employment involving a known risk or
danger." Id.
49. 231 Cal. App. 3d 674, 283 Cal. Rptr. 23 (1991).
50. See supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text. The Maehl court specifically
cited similarities to the facts of Von Beltz involving a stuntperson who had assumed the
risks inherent in a stunt where a car was driven at one speed, but not when the director
increased the speed of the car on a second take. Maehl, 231 Cal. App. 3d at 672, 283
Cal. Rptr. at 31.
51. Id.
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danger inherent in falling trees was not enough.5 2
Thus, most California appellate courts favor the continued viabil-
ity of RIAR, although some do so reluctantly. With the exception of
the Segoviano court, all seem to accept RIAR as a complete defense
when the hazards encountered are those that are clearly inherent in
the activity such that the plaintiff, by participation, can be held to
have assumed them.
E. Commentators Are Divided
Legal commentators have engaged in a significant, if limited, de-
bate over the continued vitality of assumption of risk. This debate
has sharpened with the coming of comparative negligence.53 In part,
the debate appears to arise from confusion surrounding the precise
meaning of the doctrine54 and its application to different situations. 55
Unlike most California appellate courts, the commentators fre-
quently divide reasonable implied assumption of risk into two catego-
ries: primary and secondary.56 Primary assumption of risk involves a
duty analysis. According to Prosser, in the primary context, the
"plaintiff voluntarily enters into some relation with the defendant;
with knowledge that the defendant will not protect him against ...
future risks."'57 Because of the plaintiff's decision, the defendant has
no duty to plaintiff and cannot be negligent.5
Secondary assumption of risk involves a situation in which the
plaintiff is presented with a known risk, created by the defendant's
negligence, but proceeds voluntarily to encounter it.5 9 The Restate-
52. Id.
53. See W. KEETON, D. DODDS, R. KEETON, D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON
THE LAW OF TORTS § 68, at 481 n. 10 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER AND KEE-
TON]; Fleming, The Court of California 1974-1975, Foreword: Comparative Negligence
At Last - By Judicial Choice, 64 CAL L. REV. 239, 260 (1976); 4 F. HARPER, F. JAMES
& 0. GRAY, THE LAW OF TORTS § 21.0, at 187 n.1 (1986) [hereinafter HARPER, JAMES
& GRAY]; Frizell, Assumption of Risk in California: It's Time To Get Rid Of It, 16 W.
ST. U.L. REV. 627, 628 (1989); V. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE § 9.1, at 153
(2d ed. 1986).
54. See PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 53, § 68, at 480; HARPER, JAMES &
GRAY, supra note 53, § 21.0, at 187; V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 53, § 9.1, at 154.
55. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 4, § 496A-496G; James, Assumption
of Risk: Unhappy Reincarnation, 78 YALE L.J. 185, 185 n.4 (1968).
56. See, e.g., Frizell, supra note 53, at 630.
57. PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 53, § 68, at 481 (The Knight court adopts
this position); see also Fleming, supra note 53, at 264; HARPER, JAMES & GRAY, supra
note 53, § 21.0, at 188-89; Frizell, supra note 53, at 630.
58. PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 53, § 68, at 481.
59. Id.
ment (Second) of Torts notes that in such a situation the plaintiff's
recovery is barred if the plaintiff has discovered the danger and cho-
sen to encounter it.60 Professors Harper, James and Gray describe
this secondary form of assumption of risk as a variation of negli-
gence."1 Dean Prosser, by contrast, states such conduct is in the "in-
tersection" of assumption of risk and contributory negligence, but:
[w]here they have been distinguished, the traditional basis has been that
assumption of risk is a matter of knowledge of the danger and voluntary
acquiescence in it, while contributory negligence is a matter of fault or de-
parture from the standard of conduct of the reasonable person, however
unaware, unwilling, or even protesting the plaintiff may be.6 2
Secondary assumption of risk has been almost universally criti-
cized. Under comparative negligence principles, an anomaly is cre-
ated whereby the unreasonable plaintiff is permitted to recover some
damages, but the plaintiff whose conduct is reasonable is barred
from recovering anything. 3 Professor Fleming describes the use of
assumption of risk to completely defeat a reasonable-acting plaintiff
as "whimsical," when compared to permitting an unreasonable
plaintiff to recover. 4 Even Prosser notes: "[W]here the defendant's
negligence has forced the plaintiff into a situation where he must
reasonably choose to undergo the risk, there seems to be a funda-
mental flaw in reasoning that the plaintiff should thereby be held to
have forfeited any right to charge the defendant for his resulting
injuries."6 5
Professor Schwartz, in his leading work on comparative negli-
gence, also criticizes the retention of assumption of risk. He argues,
"[a] vigorous application of implied assumption of risk as an abso-
lute defense could serve to undermine seriously the general purpose
of a comparative negligence [system] to apportion damages on the
basis of fault."66
In the sports or recreation context, primary assumption of risk
not secondary - is most frequently involved. Prosser refers to the
spectator at a baseball game who sits "in an unscreened seat, and so
consent[s] that the players may proceed with the game without tak-
ing precautions to protect him from being hit by the ball."67 John
Fleming concurs that a spectator or participant in a sport, who is
familiar with the rules, assumes the inherent risks thereby eliminat-
60. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 4, § 496C, comment f.
61. HARPER, JAMES & GRAY, supra note 53, § 21.0, at 189.
62. PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 53, § 68, at 481-82.
63. See, e.g., PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 53, § 68, at 498; Segoviano v.
Hous. Auth., 143 Cal. App. 3d 162, 170, 191 Cal. Rptr. 578, 583-84 (1983).
64. Fleming, supra note 53, at 262.
65. PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 53, § 68, at 497.
66. V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 53, § 9.5, at 180.
67. PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 53, § 68, at 481.
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ing the defendant's duty of care.68 Harper, James and Gray also
agree that players have no duty to protect other participants from
normal play activities.6 9 This theme is echoed by Professor Frizell
who wrote: "Participation [in a sporting event] is implied consent to
whatever is permitted by the rules, or to be expected within the cus-
toms of the game."'70
Primary assumption has been criticized because it is simply "the
counterpart of the defendant's lack of duty" and "a confusing way of
stating certain no duty rules."' 71 In this context, commentators' con-
cern is not with the result, but with the donfusion they claim occurs
between assumption of risk and traditional duty issues.72
Recently, Professor Frizell argued that RIAR, in its primary
form, is not a defense to negligence because it deals with the issue of
duty. Frizell maintains when no duty exists, there can be no breach,
and therefore no negligence that requires a defense.7 3 Nonetheless,
Prosser and Fleming refer to the doctrine as the assumption of risk
defense.74
While Dean Prosser acknowledges that primary assumption of risk
can be a duty issue, he generally supports retention of a separate
doctrine. "[B]y entering freely and voluntarily into any relation or
situation where the negligence of the defendant is obvious, the plain-
tiff may be found to accept and consent to it, and to undertake to
look out for himself .. .
Professor Schwartz distinguishes the consent analogy, pointing out
that one consents to what is known, but assumption of risk infers a
"consent" to what might be - i.e., the unknown. 76 He concludes that
"facts constituting assumption of risk are as close to contributory
negligence as they are to consent."" When a person voluntarily en-
counters a known risk, "this is a form of responsibility or
fault. . . ,,18 He explains: "The true meaning of comparative negli-
68. Fleming, supra note 53, at 264.
69. HARPER, JAMES & GRAY, supra note 53, § 21.3, at 223.
70. Frizell, supra note 53, at 640 (emphasis added).
71. HARPER, JAMES & GRAY, supra note 53, § 21.0, at 189-90; See also V.
SCHWARTZ, supra note 53, § 9.1, at 157.
72. See HARPER, JAMES & GRAY, supra note 53, § 21.0, at 189.
73. Frizell, supra note 53, at 627, 630.
74. PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 53, § 68, at 486; Fleming, supra note 53, at
239, 264.
75. PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 53, § 68, at 485 (emphasis added).
76. V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 53, § 9.5, at 179.
77. Id. at 179-80.
78. Id. at 180.
gence is comparative responsibility. When a plaintiff engages in clas-
sic assumption of risk conduct, he is in part responsible for his in-
jury. 7 9 Thus, Schwartz would abolish assumption of risk as a
complete and separate defense and merge it with comparative
negligence.
Thus, the legal commentators have an important point of agree-
ment, despite their theoretical differences. Even those who criticize
the use of primary assumption of risk as an analysis of duty, seem to
agree the defendant is relieved of exercising due care when the risks
are inherent in the activity. Disagreement arises when the defendant
has acted negligently and has exposed the plaintiff to the risk (sec-
ondary assumption of risk). However, those who oppose the doctrine
under this circumstance seem to agree that the plaintiff's recovery
should be reduced (although not barred), because the plaintiff's un-
reasonable conduct constitutes contributory negligence. The point of
greatest contention is whether a plaintiff who reasonably encounters
a known risk should be barred from recovery or permitted full
recovery.
III. KNIGHT V. JEWETT
A. Facts
In January 1987, Kendra Knight joined a group of men and
women to watch the annual Super Bowl football game at a home in
Vista, California.80 During half-time, Knight and Jewett, among
others, decided to play a "pick-up" game of co-ed touch football. 8'
Shortly after they had begun to play, Knight warned Jewett to play
less roughly.82 Nevertheless, on the next play, Jewett knocked her
down and stepped on the little finger of her right hand.83 After three
unsuccessful surgeries, Knight's finger was amputated.84
The specific facts of how the accident happened are in dispute.88
However, Knight did not contest that she was familiar with football
(having played the game and watched it on television), 86 and that
79. Id. (emphasis in original).
80. Knight v. Jewett, 232 Cal. App. 3d 1142, 1146, 275 Cal. Rptr. 292, 293
(1990), rev. granted, - Cal. 3d -, 804 P.2d 1300, 278 Cal. Rptr. 203 (1991).
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 1147, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 293.
84. Id.
85. Jewett claims he "jumped up to intercept a pass and as he came down he
knocked Knight over. When he landed, he stepped back and onto Knight's hand." Id.
Knight's version has Jewett knocking her down from behind as they both ran down the
field. Id. at 1147, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 293-94. She claims she "put her arms out to break
the fall and Jewett ran over her, stepping on her hand." Id. at 1147, 275 Cal. Rptr. 294.
86. Knight was "an avid television watcher of Monday night professional football
and sometime touch football player. . . .". Id. at 1150, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 296.
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she voluntarily participated in the half-time game.8 7 The court also
found "Jewett did not intend to step on Knight's hand and did not
intend to hurt her.""8
Knight sued Jewett for negligence and assault and battery.89 The
trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Jewett based on
the defense of reasonable implied assumption of risk.90 Knight
appealed.
B. Fourth District Appellate Opinion
The Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed the lower court's
decision holding that RIAR is a complete defense to an action for
negligence.91 The court also held that the facts did not support a
claim for assault and battery because no evidence established the
requisite intent.92
After a brief review of the decisional history since Li, the Knight
court asserted that Ordway contains "the definitive statement of the
law" of RIAR13 The doctrine implies a prior agreement between
plaintiff and defendant that the defendant is relieved of the duty of
due care because the plaintiff is knowingly and voluntarily assuming
the risk of injury inherent in the activity. 4
Knight asserted that the defense was "inapplicable because Jew-
ett's conduct was outside the reasonable expectations of the partici-
pants"; but the Court of Appeal found this contention unpersua-
sive.95 The court also rejected Knight's argument that Ordway
applied only to professional athletes, not amateurs.98 In essence, the
opinion looked to the very nature of the activity and determined "in
the context of sports, it is always unrealistic to expect a narrow
range of conduct among the participants.1 97 The court explained: "It
87. Id. at 1146, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 293.
88. Id. at 1147, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 294.
89. Id. at 1146, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 293.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 1153, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 297-98.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 1149, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 295. By relying on Ordway, the Knight court
assumed the viability of RIAR as a complete and separate defense.
94. Knight v. Jewett, 232 Cal. App. 3d at 1153, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 297-98.
95. Id. at 1150, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 296.
96. Id. at 1150 n.3, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 296 n.3. Although Ordway involved a profes-
sional jockey, the Knight court explained RIAR also applies to amateurs because the
benefits of assuming a risk enumerated by the Ordway court included recreational pleas-
ure as well as economic gain. Knight, 232 Cal. App. 3d at 1150 n.3, 275 Cal. Rptr. at
296 n.3.
97. Id. at 1150, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 296 (emphasis added).
is axiomatic that those who engage in or follow competitive sports
know physical conduct causing injuries is routinely caused by both
the acts of adversaries and of collaborators by reason of the very
nature of the activity in which all participate."98 Thus, Knight's par-
ticipation, itself, amounted to a knowing and voluntary assumption
of the risk.9'
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Did the Supreme Court Eliminate RIAR?
As previously discussed, California's appellate courts disagree on
whether the supreme court eliminated the assumption of risk defense
in its decision in Li v. Yellow Cab Co.. The Segoviano court inter-
preted the Li language, "held to agree,"100 to mean "expressly"
agrees and thus concluded the court had abolished implied assump-
tion of risk.101 Other courts believe that the Li court's reliance on
Grey v. Fibreboard Paper Products, Co. in discussing assumption of
risk "implicitly recognized the continuing validity of [the doc-
trine]. ,,,"12 because Grey was dealing only with the distinction
between "reasonable" and "unreasonable," not "express" and "im-
plied."' 03 The majority of courts, including the Knight court, believe
the supreme court left the question open.104 The fact that the su-
preme court has accepted Knight for review (along with numerous
other assumption of risk cases) strongly suggests that, if it has not
resolved the issue, it soon will.
B. Should RIAR Be Abolished?
1. Logic
Both courts and commentators have questioned the logic of main-
taining RIAR after adoption of comparative negligence. As the
98. Id. at 1150, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 295-96.
99. Id. at 1150, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 296.
100. Li, 13 Cal. 3d at 824-25, 532 P.2d at 1240-41, 119 Cal. Rptr. 872-73 (1975).
See supra text accompanying note 14 for full quote.
101. Segoviano v. Hous. Auth., 143 Cal. App. 3d 162, 168-69, 191 Cal. Rptr. 578,
583 (1983).
102. Krol v. Sampson, 227 Cal. App. 3d 724, 728 n.3, 278 Cal. Rptr. 164, 167 n.3
(1991), rev. granted, - Cal. 3d -, 811 P.2d 10, 282 Cal. Rptr. 124 (1991).
103. Id. In Grey, the court found that an experienced machinist acted unreasona-
bly in encountering a known risk when he was injured while repairing the defendant's
paper cutting machine. Grey v. Fibreboard Paper Products Co., 65 Cal. 2d 240, 242,
245-46, 418 P.2d 153, 154, 156, 53 Cal. Rptr. 545, 546, 548 (1966).
104. See, e.g., Ford v. Gouin, 227 Cal. App. 3d 1175, 1179, 266 Cal. Rptr. 870,
872 (1990), rev. granted, - Cal. 3d -, 791 P.2d 290, 269 Cal. Rptr. 720 (1990);
Harrold v. Rolling J Ranch, 228 Cal. App. 3d 260, 272, 266 Cal. Rptr. 734, 742 (1990),
modified, 218 Cal. App 3d 841a, rev. granted, - Cal. 3d -, 791 P.2d 290, 269
Cal. Rptr. 720 (1990).
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question is frequently put: "Why should someone who acts unreason-
ably be allowed to recover under comparative negligence while some-
one who acts reasonably is barred from any recovery? 10 5 Ordway
provides an explanation of this seeming anomaly: "[T]he problem is
not of law but semantics. If the 'reasonable-unreasonable' labels
were simply changed to 'knowing and intelligent' versus 'negligent or
careless,' the concepts would be more easily understood."' 0 6 Com-
mentators have criticized this explanation, but have not agreed on an
explicit solution.'
The options are three: (1) maintain RIAR as a complete bar, (2)
allow the plaintiff full recovery, or (3) apportion damages by com-
paring the plaintiff's reasonable action with the defendant's unrea-
sonable (i.e., negligent) conduct. Knight v. Jewett exemplifies this
conundrum. If the doctrine is maintained as a complete defense,
Knight receives nothing for her serious injuries despite her reasona-
bleness. If the doctrine is abolished, Jewett is charged with a duty to
protect Knight, even though Jewett himself was exposed to the same
risks. And, if their conduct is compared, Knight's reasonable (non-
negligent) action becomes the basis for recovery (if Jewett is found
to be negligent toward her). The first option appears to punish rea-
sonableness, the second is unfair from the defendant's perspective,
and the third creates a new anomaly that flies in the face of almost
400 years of negligence, or fault-based, law. 08
2. A Useful Doctrine
Proponents of the doctrine argue RIAR remains viable and neces-
sary, because it is not part of comparative negligence. When a plain-
tiff is acting reasonably (i.e., not negligently), it is illogical to con-
sider her contributorily negligent in order to apportion 100 percent
of the fault to her.'09 Thus, dealing with a plaintiff's reasonable ac-
tions in assuming known risks requires a separate doctrine. In such
105. See supra text accompanying notes 63-65. This is the basis of the Segoviano
court's reasoning that: "Elimination of RIAR as a separate defense avoids punishing
reasonable conduct." Segoviano, 143 Cal. App. 3d at 170, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 584.
106. Ordway v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. App. 3d 98, 105, 243 Cal. Rptr. 536, 540
(1988).
107. See, e.g., Frizell, supra note 53, at 646 (favors abolition of RIAR); PROSSER
AND KEETON, supra note 53, § 68, at 497 (favors maintenance of doctrine as a complete
bar).
108. Weaver v. Ward, Hobart 134, 80 Eng. Rep. 284 (King's Bench 1616) (cited
by Prosser as earliest known case recognizing fault requirement for liability. W. PROSSER,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 5-6 (8th ed. 1988)).
109. V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 53, § 9.5, at 179.
cases, detractors generally do not dispute the result of no liability to
the defendant. They contend, however, that reasonable implied as-
sumption of risk is superfluous - just another way of stating no
duty rules. 110 Indeed, a majority of appellate courts appear to agree
that primary RIAR results in no duty and, therefore, no negligence
on the part of the defendant."1 Yet RIAR has value as a separate
defense, because it focuses attention on the plaintiff's conduct, where
the traditional duty analysis focuses on the defendant's conduct. 1 2
Again, Knight v. Jewett provides an appropriate illustration. In
evaluating Jewett's RIAR defense, the Knight court explained that
the dispute about how the accident happened was "immaterial."' 13
The defendant's conduct was important only to the extent that it was
"within the ordinary expectations of the participants in the particu-
lar sport."' 4 The focus of the inquiry was rightly on the plaintiff's
conduct to determine whether she knew and appreciated the risks
and voluntarily assumed them. 5
3. Policy Considerations
Policy arguments exist on both sides of the debate. The personal,
social, economic or other benefits derived by sports participants are
generally cited as the primary reasons for maintaining an assump-
tion of risk defense. As explained by the court in Krol v.
Sampson:1 6
Finally, we note that precluding liability for simple negligence in sporting
contests, where the participants have actual knowledge of a sport's inherent
risks, furthers the policy that active and vigorous participation in athletic
endeavors should not be discouraged by the threat of litigation. Participa-
tion in recreational team sports is a socially desirable activity offering bene-
fits to the participants and society as a whole. When an accidental in-jury . . occurs, it is unfortunate that the victim and family must bear the
loss; but the alternative is to turn recreational sports into grist for the mills
of litigation1117
Even the Segoviano court, while it rejected the doctrine, recognized
this justification for reasonable implied assumption of risk. 1 8 Indeed,
110. See supra text accompanying notes 71-72.
111. See supra text accompanying notes 37-39.
112. See Lopez v. McDonald's Corp., 193 Cal. App. 3d 495, 505, 238 Cal. Rptr.
436, 441 (1987).
113. Knight, 232 Cal. App. 3d at 1151, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 297.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. 227 Cal. App. 3d 724, 278 Cal. Rptr. 164 (1991), rev. granted, - Cal. 3d
_-.,811 P.2d 10, 282 Cal. Rptr. 124 (1991).
117. Id. at 738, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 174.
118.
Flag football is usually beneficial to all the participants and to society as a
whole. Such activity should be encouraged.... Anyone who participates in an
organized, socially approved recreational activity is fully aware of the possibil-
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the California Supreme Court has expressed concern about the im-
pact abolition of RIAR might have on recreational sports: "If every
person helping someone enjoy recreation . . . is subject to litigation,
we will ultimately put everyone out of business, won't we?" 1 9
As a corollary, at least one court has cited judicial efficiency as a
reason to maintain the RIAR doctrine. 120 Reasonable implied as-
sumption of risk as a complete defense allows the court to find no
duty on the part of the defendant as a matter of law and thus dis-
pose of meritless cases at the summary judgment stage.121
Opponents of RIAR contend the doctrine is inconsistent with the
purpose of tort law, which is to compensate injured plaintiffs. 122 As
Justice Kline of the First District frequently points out in his dis-
sents: RIAR is a "'defendant's doctrine that... cuts down the com-
pensation of accident victims.' 123 Retaining the doctrine, according
to the president of the California Trial Lawyers Association, "would
allow a wrongdoer to get off scot-free, even though he was partially
or totally at fault. 1 24
The controversy on this point can be resolved to some extent by
making the distinction that most commentators make between pri-
mary and secondary assumption of risk. In sports cases, when an
injury is sustained by a knowledgeable and voluntary participant as
the result of a hazard inherent in the sport, primary reasonable im-
plied assumption of risk should be applied. By his participation, the
plaintiff has assumed those risks and must bear the burden of injury
to obtain the benefits of play. In such situations, a sports participant
is not a "victim" of another's "fault" because the participant has
relieved the defendant of any duty toward him. On the other hand,
when another's negligence has created a hazard that is not inherent
in the sport, the doctrine is arguably inapplicable unless the evidence
shows the plaintiff knowingly and voluntarily assumed the new or
increased risk.
ity of injury due to violation of the rules of play, yet the decision to play may
be perfectly reasonable.
Segoviano, 143 Cal. App. 3d at 175, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 587-88.
119. Hager, supra note 6, at A19, col. 3 (quoting Justice Armand Arabian hearing
argument in Ford v. Gouin).
120. Ford, 227 Cal. App. 3d at 1188, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 878.
121. Id.
122. See HARPER, JAMES & GRAY, supra note 53, § 21.8, at 259.
123. Ford, 227 Cal. App. 3d at 1197, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 884 (Kline, J. dissenting,
quoting HARPER, JAMES & GRAY, supra note 53).
124. Hager, supra note 6, at A19, col. 1 (quoting Ian Herzog).
V. RECOMMENDED SUPREME COURT ACTION
A. Affirmation of RIAR Doctrine
The California Supreme Court should follow its previous orders
and precedents by affirming reasonable implied assumption of risk as
a viable defense. The court has already given a "strong signal" in
favor of the doctrine in the procedural history of Ordway. 25 The
defendants in Ordway sought a writ of mandate from the denial of
their motion for summary judgment by the trial court. At first, the
Fourth District Court of Appeal refused to hear the petition, and
defendants requested review by the California Supreme Court.
While the supreme court did not itself hear the petition, it remanded
the matter to the Fourth District with directions to grant the writ in
light of the New York case of Turcotte v. Fell.2 6 On similar facts,
Turcotte held that the doctrine of RIAR barred an action for negli-
gence.127 "Taking its cue from our supreme court, the Ordway court
held that reasonable implied assumption of risk is still a complete
defense in California.' 28 Significantly, the supreme court subse-
quently denied review of the Ordway decision.129
The supreme court's reaffirmation of the Fireman's Rule in the
post-Li case of Walters v. Sloan30 is also indicative of the court's
approval of the RIAR doctrine. "The 'fireman's rule' is based pri-
marily upon the principle of assumption of risk."' 3'
The reasons for affirming RIAR as a complete and separate de-
fense are several and significant. First, RIAR provides a necessary
defense under California's system of comparative fault when contrib-
125. Krol v. Sampson, 227 Cal. App. 3d 724, 739, 278 Cal. Rptr. 164, 174-75
(1991) (White, J., concurring), rev. granted, - Cal. 3d _, 811 P.2d 10, 282 Cal.
Rptr. 124 (1991). But see Kline, J., dissenting in Ford, questioning the procedural pos-
ture of Ordway as a precursor of the*Supreme Court's view of RIAR:
[T]he Supreme Court did not call public attention to its order or require its
publication . . . ; it is therefore doubtful that the Supreme Court itself ever
intended or expected that its administrative order would exert precedential ef-
fect in subsequent cases. Moreover, the order did not require the Court of Ap-
peal to reach any particular result, the appellate court was directed only to
consider the Turcotte opinion in the process of evaluating Ordway's petition.
Ford v. Gouin, 227 Cal. App. 3d 1196, 1627 n.5, 266 Cal. Rptr. 870, 883 n.5 (1990)
(Kline, J., dissenting), rev. granted, - Cal. 3d -, 791 P.2d 290, 269 Cal. Rptr.
720 (1990).
126. 68 N.Y.2d 432, 502 N.E.2d 964, 510 N.Y.S.2d 49 (1986).
127. Id. at 441, 502 N.E.2d at 969, 510 N.Y.S.2d at 54.
128. Krol, 227 Cal. App. 3d at 739, 278 Cal. Rptr. at 175 (White, J., concurring).
129. Ordway v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. App. 3d 98, 112 (1988) (no parallel
citation in Cal. Rptr.).
130. 20 Cal. 3d 199, 571 P.2d 609, 142 Cal. Rptr. 152 (1977). "The fireman's rule
provides that negligence in causing a fire furnishes no basis for liability to a professional
fireman injured fighting the fire." Id. at 202, 571 P.2d at 610, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 153.
131. Nelson v. Hall, 165 Cal. App. 3d 709, 714, 211 Cal. Rptr. 668, 672 (1985)
(citations omitted).
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utory negligence does not apply. In many respects, assumption of
risk begins where contributory negligence leaves off. In the situation
where sports participants impliedly consent to take their chances, a
faultless or reasonable-acting plaintiff should not be able to hold a
co-participant defendant (who was exposed to the very same risks)
liable.
Second, RIAR levels the playing field by focusing on the plaintiff's
conduct. The successful RIAR defense results in no duty on the part
of the defendant, but it does so by examining what the plaintiff knew
and appreciated. Be it Judy Casella, the professional jockey in
Ordway, or Kendra Knight, the recreational touch football player,
the correct analysis is whether the plaintiff's actions amounted to a
knowing and voluntary assumption of risk. As the Knight court cor-
rectly pointed out, the defendant's behavior is only germane to the
extent that it is within the normal range of conduct for the sport.
Third, RIAR serves important public policies. Appellate courts
agree that sports activities are socially desirable and rewarding to
the individual participants. The decision to engage in such activities,
thereby encountering inherent or known and appreciated hazards, is
an exercise in choice that should not be limited by the threat of liti-
gation. The benefits of engaging in sports - whether for excitement,
recreational pleasure, competitive challenge, health and fitness, per-
sonal satisfaction, or monetary compensation - should be freely
available to those who wish to participate. Neither society nor indi-
vidual sports participants are served by substituting the lawyer,
judge and jury for the teammate, opponent and referee.
RIAR as a separate and complete defense also achieves important
public policy goals by conserving scarce judicial resources. A finding
of RIAR as a matter of law results in no duty and, therefore, no
negligence, so courts can dispose of appropriate cases at the sum-
mary judgment stage.
B. Scope of the Doctrine
Although the California Supreme Court should validate RIAR as
a complete and separate defense in actions for negligence, it may
wish to circumscribe the doctrine in some respects. Both case law
and commentators demonstrate ways to limit the doctrine. The com-
mentators draw a meaningful distinction between primary and sec-
ondary assumption of risk, which the court is urged to adopt. The
primary version, where risks inherent in the activity are impliedly
assumed through voluntary participation, should be explicitly re-
tained in the area of sports for the policy reasons previously dis-
cussed. 132 In contrast, the secondary form of reasonable implied as-
sumption of risk, involving hazards created by the defendant's
negligence, should be clarified and limited. If the plaintiff's actions
are deemed unreasonable in encountering the risk, then the doctrine
is subsumed under comparative negligence as a variation of contribu-
tory negligence. If the plaintiff acted reasonably (knowingly and vol-
untarily) in assuming the negligence, the doctrine should justifiably
apply. As the Knight court noted, citing Prosser, one who knowingly
and voluntarily confronts a danger is "'regarded as tacitly or im-
pliedly consenting to the negligence, and agreeing to take his own
chances.' "133 Affirmation of the doctrine, even in this secondary con-
text, supports the public policy of encouraging sports activities.
However, the court can still fulfill other public policies (e.g., com-
pensating injured plaintiffs) by narrowly defining the terms "know-
ing and voluntary.' 3 4 For the RIAR doctrine to be applied to a par-
ticular fact situation, the court should make clear that the plaintiff
must have "actual knowledge of the specific danger involved and the
magnitude of the risk involved."13 5 This does not mean, however,
that the plaintiff must have "prescience that the particular accident
and injury which in fact occurred was going to occur."' 38 Neverthe-
less, as illustrated in Harrold, even if the injury sustained (falling off
a horse) is of the type inherent in the sport (horseback riding), the
plaintiff should not be deemed to have assumed the risk unless he or
she has full knowledge and appreciation of the all the hazards in-
volved - including those which may be created by the defendant's
negligence.13 7
Finally, the court can make the doctrine more flexible by holding
that RIAR is not always a matter of law for the court to decide. The
supreme court can direct trial courts to involve the jury when ques-
tions arise regarding the nature of the inherent risks, the actual
knowledge of the plaintiff, or the voluntariness of the participa-
132. See supra notes 116-21 and accompanying text.
133. Knight, 232 Cal. App. 3d at 1149, 275 Cal. Rptr. at 295 (emphasis in origi-
nal). Although Knight is an example of primary assumption of risk, the court appears to
recognize the possibility of assuming the risk of negligence (a concept generally associ-
ated with secondary assumption of risk).
134. See, e.g., PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 53, § 68, at 486-90; Harrold v.
Rolling J. Ranch, 228 Cal. App. 3d 260, 269, 266 Cal. Rptr. 736, 745 (1990), modified,
218 Cal. App. 3d 841a, rev. granted, - Cal. 3d -, 791 P.2d 290, 269 Cal. Rptr.
720 (1990).
135. Harrold, 228 Cal. App. 3d at 274, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 743 (citations omitted,
emphasis in original). See also supra text accompanying note 49.
136. Tavernier v. Maes, 242 Cal. App. 2d 532, 543, 51 Cal. Rptr. 575, 582 (1966)
(pre-Li recreational injury case in which plaintiff was severely injured when a runner slid
into second base during a softball game at a family picnic).
137. PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 53, § 68, at 486-92.
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tion.138 Thus RIAR will only be applied as a complete bar in appro-
priate cases.
VI. CONCLUSION
With Knight v. Jewett (and other RIAR cases) before the Califor-
nia Supreme Court, California courts will soon learn whether rea-
sonable implied assumption of risk remains a separate and complete
defense under the state's comparative negligence system. In sports
injury cases, the supreme court should affirm primary RIAR as an
elimination of a defendant's duty. Strong policy reasons argue for
maintaining RIAR as a bar to recovery when a plaintiff voluntarily
encounters risks inherent in a sport. However, when a defendant's
negligence creates the risk (secondary RIAR), the doctrine should
be carefully applied. For policy reasons, the court should uphold the
bar when knowing and voluntary assumption is proved. When the
evidence is less certain, however, the court may well be advised to
leave it to a jury. The jury then will evaluate the reasonableness of
the plaintiff's action by determining her knowledge and appreciation
of the dangers involved and the voluntariness of her participation.
ANN K. BRADLEY
138. This approach has been suggested by Prosser, Fleming, Frizell and several
courts. See, e.g., PROSSER AND KEETON, supra note 53, §68, at 487; Harrold, 228 Cal.
App. 3d at 265-66, 266 Cal. Rptr. at 742.

